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Abstract
This paper discusses the relation between the later Husserl and the later Heidegger 
regarding their criticisms of modern science and technology. It is suggested that the 
overlap between both accounts is more significant than is standardly acknowledged. 
The paper first explores Heidegger’s ideas about the ‘essences’ of science and tech-
nology, how they allegedly determine the contemporary worldview, conceal our rela-
tion to being, and how Heidegger warrants his critical attitude toward this. It then dis-
cusses Husserl’s philosophical–historical assessment of the ‘idea’ of modern science, 
which Husserl believed resulted in the decapitation of philosophical questioning. 
Although key differences in method, aims, and their proposed solution to the domi-
nance of the technological-scientific worldview should not be overlooked, the paper 
suggests that core aspects of Heidegger’s analyses can be traced back to Husserl.
Keywords Husserl · Heidegger · Technology · Science · Phenomenology · 
Lifeworld · Being
Introduction
In spite of the depth of the divergence of Heidegger’s thinking from Husserl’s—
which originated already during their collaborations in Freiburg1 and only deepened 
from thereon—there is a theme which unites near to all philosophical efforts of both 
 * Corijn van Mazijk 
 c.m.a.van.mazijk@rug.nl
 https://corijnvanmazijk.com/
1 Faculty of Philosophy, Department of the History of Philosophy, University of Groningen, Oude 
Boteringestraat 52, 9712 GL Groningen, The Netherlands
1 Heidegger’s thinking of the late 1910s and early 1920s could be qualified as ‘essentially Husserlian’ 
(Crowell 2013: 59). Heidegger’s shift in focus to being took place in the course of the mid-1920s. The 
definitive nature of their break is perhaps most clearly expressed in the failed collaborative attempt on 
the Encyclopaedia Britannica article in 1927 (see Husserl 1997b), but also in Heidegger’s publication of 
Being and Time.
520 C. van Mazijk 
1 3
thinkers: their primal concern with the fate of western humanity. Husserl and Hei-
degger both operated in what is one of the most turbulent of all times western culture 
has had to endure. Moreover, both understood their own thinking directly in relation 
to an imminent crisis of the west. They both firmly believed humanity stood in need 
of a new spiritual orientation which the scientific developments of modernity had 
somehow been obstructing. Moreover, both felt that to provide such direction itself 
was to set on a kind of spiritual task which they had been called upon to take up.
Yet both thinkers took up this task in what prima facie appear to be very dif-
ferent ways. Husserl honestly considered that the transcendental phenomenology he 
had developed was the culmination of all the spiritual and philosophical efforts of 
human history (see Hua VI 13, 71). This progression of history for him was iden-
tical to the progression of reason. Transcendental phenomenology was to be the 
ultimate rational and therewith simultaneously the ultimate responsible philosophy. 
Evidently, the completion of such a trajectory ought itself to take a rational shape; 
it can only exist in complete transparency to itself, and thus must present itself in 
unambiguous terms and with demanding scientific rigor. It is from this towering 
viewpoint that Husserl claims to identify a threat to western society, seeks to trace 
its origins through modern history of science, and finally proposes a cure to it.
Heidegger understood his philosophical calling quite differently. It is often said 
that Heidegger was more sensitive to history, practice, and inter-subjectivity, and 
that the limits of reason within the bounds set by those factors was not understood 
by Husserl. It is hard, I think, to maintain such a view for anyone acquainted with 
the breadth and depth of Husserl’s thought. But at the least it seems uncontrover-
sial that Heidegger believed Husserl’s project had to be rejected on grounds of it 
being an onto-theological hubris beyond the reach of mortal beings. This is hardly 
a signal of modesty on Heidegger’s behalf, however, who in turn claimed insight 
into the peculiar form of understanding shaping his time unavailable to most others.2 
This form of understanding is what he called the ‘essence’ of technology (Wesen 
der Technik),3 in turn closely related to the so-called ‘essence’ of modern science 
(Wesen der modernen Wissenschaft).4 For Heidegger, the threat posed by them does 
not lie in obfuscating the one true path of reason, but in concealing our relationship 
to being.
In spite of the abundance of literature on the relation between various aspects of 
their thinking, Heidegger’s later critique of technology and science5 is still rarely 
studied with regard to its relation to Husserl’s critique of modern science and 
2 In the 1975 NESKE television interview Heidegger sees himself and his understanding of the task of 
thinking as akin to those ‘five or six’ scientists who truly understand the ‘physical laws’ governing the 
workings of a radio or television.
3 In Die Frage nach der Technik (1953), referred to with abbreviations ‘FT’.
4 In Wissenschaft und Besinnung (1953), referred to with abbreviations ‘WuB’. Two other texts of this 
volume (GA 7) Überwindung der Metaphysik and Wer ist Nietzsches Zarathustra are referred to with 
abbreviations ‘ÜdM’ and ‘WNZ’.
5 An early, albeit more implicit, critique of science can also be found in the earlier Sein und Zeit (1927), 




technological thinking. Although no sufficient reasons, this could be partially due to 
the lack of strong evidence that Heidegger studied Husserl’s Krisis der europäischen 
Wissenschaften (1936)6 or simply to the notorious difficulty of Husserl’s work gen-
erally. It may also have to do with Heidegger’s so-called Kehre,7 which is generally 
seen as weakening ties to phenomenology—and thus also, it may be assumed, to 
Husserl’s critique of modern science. It would be contentious, however, to qualify 
Husserl’s historical analyses in his final work as strictly phenomenological—which 
means this too cannot straightforwardly dispense of the need to explore the conver-
gence of their respective critiques of the technological-scientific worldview.
This paper seeks to explore the depth of that convergence as well as to highlight 
the essentially different philosophical viewpoints from which it takes place. In con-
tra-chronological order, section two first deals with Heidegger’s critique of technol-
ogy and science in his writings after the Kehre. After that, section three traces some 
of Heidegger’s ideas in Husserl’s interpretation developed just over 15 years earlier. 
In the final part, I conclude that, irrespective of the historical question whether Hei-
degger studied Husserl’s final work in detail, many core aspects of Heidegger’s cri-
tique can be traced back to Husserl.
Heidegger on the Technological‑Scientific Worldview
Few scholars would say Heidegger’s later writings on technology are an easy read. 
This is particularly due to the way they are tied into his elusive philosophy of being. 
Indeed, the ‘essence’ of technology has ‘everything’ to do with being (FT 16). It 
can therefore be useful to start from a distinction made much earlier by Heidegger 
called the ontological difference (ontologische Differenz).8 As Nicholson (1985) put 
it some 30  years ago, the ontological difference is between ‘on one side, all that 
exists, on the other, the very existence of what exists’ (Nicholson 1985: 357). In 
other words, it is the difference between what is and the being of what is; so between 
beings and their being.
At first sight, this may not seem to get us very far. The distinction between being 
and beings—traditionally understood within the dichotomy of essences or sub-
stances as abstract property-bearers and their predicables—is obviously an old one, 
and making it by no means solves the problem of how exactly to account for being. 
Traditional western philosophy has understood being both as property—a special 
kind of property (Aquinas, among others) or a property of concepts or propositional 
constructs (Frege and Russell, respectively)—and not as a property (most nota-
bly Locke and Hume; the former regarding being as substance, the latter rejecting 
6 Full title: Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie: Eine Ein-
leitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie. The work is usually considered unfinished; see Bossert 
(1974) for a discussion. According to Cumming, there is no evidence Heidegger studied the work (Cum-
ming 2001: 145).
7 There is no consensus on when the Kehre took place. It is usually located in the 1930s, after the publi-
cation of Being and Time but before the work on technology.
8 The term first appears in the 1927 summer lecture Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie.
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sub-stances ‘standing under’ sensible properties). As is well known, Heidegger 
believed the general approach underlying all these views to be false. For him, being 
can be thought of neither as sub-stance accommodating properties nor as a property 
itself. It must, therefore, be qualified in a wholly different way, as was Heidegger’s 
principal concern throughout his career.
Although a somewhat blunt over-generalization, it can be helpful to distinguish 
two general ways in which Heidegger approached the issue of being. First, we can 
think of the earlier Heidegger (of Sein und Zeit) as interested particularly in what 
enables us (as ‘Dasein’) to relate to being. Simpler put: what sort of conditions 
(Existenzialen) need be in place in order for Dasein to be able to ask the question 
of being in the first place (SZ 11–15)?9 This first approach, then, rather than taking 
the problem head on, circles it by asking for the conditions presupposed by the very 
question. Asking for the conditions for asking about being (a capacity most of the 
other animals presumably lack) allowed Heidegger to embark on a relatively system-
atic ‘transcendental’ (concerning conditions of possibility) task, as we find in Being 
and Time.
Second, the Heidegger after the Kehre can be thought of as occupied primarily 
with our contemporary lack of concern for being. The issue to be understood here is: 
how come we do not ask about being? Or put differently: why did being drift so far 
out of sight? And how might we ever retrieve it again more fully? Arguably, this is 
a more elusive concern than the earlier one, and Heidegger’s approach to it did not 
involve breaking it down into a network of interrelated conditions of possibility. To 
some extent, this absence of a quasi-analytic pursuit of various conditions of possi-
bility explains the (yet more) cryptic flavor of the later writings.
To be sure, twentieth century philosophy did ask the question of being. It would 
be absurd to claim that the whole issue of being escaped notice of philosophers at 
any epoch of traditional philosophy from Thales up to now. But Heidegger, as eve-
rybody knows, believed they all asked the question in the wrong way. The right way 
of thinking about being, Heidegger thought, has drifted out of sight. Looking for the 
source or cause of this is precisely what brought the later Heidegger to investigate 
into what he called the ‘essence’ of technology.
The very question characterizing the later work—why being allegedly does not 
show itself to us today as a concern for thinking—nicely points us to the idea that 
there are different ways in which things can show up for us, including indeed being 
itself. This idea of a way in which things appear or are disclosed (Weise des Entber-
gens) in fact marks the core of Heidegger’s later thoughts about being and technol-
ogy.10 To understand this, we may start with something we can all readily observe: 
10 “Die Technik is also nich bloß ein Mittel. Die Technik ist eine Weise des Entbergens” (FT 16), i.e., a 
way of things showing up. Also: “Die Frage nach der Technik ist die Frage nach der Konstellation, in der 
sich Entbergung und Verbergung, in der sich das Wesende der Wahrheit ereignet” (FT 37).
9 ‘Das primär Befragte in der Frage nach dem Sinn des Seins ist das Seiende vom Charakter des 
Daseins. Die vorbereitende existenziale Analytik des Dasein bedarf selbst ihrer Eigenart gemäβ einer 
vorzeichnenden Exposition und Abgrenzung gegen scheinbar mit ihr gleichlaufende Untersuchungen 
[…]. Auf dem Boden der Analyse dieser Fundamentalstruktur wird eine vorläufige Anzeige des Seins 




that the very same things can appear quite differently to different people. If, for 
instance, I am familiar with a certain song played on the radio, and you are not, then 
the song is bound to appear differently to you than to me. Likewise, we can imag-
ine people from different cultures perceive the same objects differently. This need 
not necessarily be a matter of plain recognition. Standing at proximal distance to an 
acquaintance can be comfortable for one person and less so for another—yet neither 
is here at failure of recognizing any particular thing. We can explain such and other 
cases by saying that people have different background understandings or, to use phe-
nomenological jargon, to say that they stand in different cultural horizons. It is due 
to our standing in complexly shaped cultural horizons that we are able to see the 
same things, yet see them in surprisingly different ways.
Dreyfus (1993), in an attempt to simplify matters, connects Heidegger’s later con-
cerns about being to such background understandings shaped by largely implicit cul-
tural norms and practices. Dreyfus suggests the distinction between things appear-
ing and the way they appear matches well Heidegger’s differentiation of beings and 
being.11 What explicitly comes to view in experience is, very generally speaking, 
things. What does not really come to view yet is tied inherently to the appearing 
of things is the implicit horizontal understanding within which those things doom 
up. Now these two sides are of course never entirely distinct. In fact there exist no 
‘bare things’ which stand out of a cultural horizon in utter indifference to that hori-
zon.12 Not only is everything caught up in a culturally and historically shaped way 
of appearing. Moreover, Heidegger thinks things are also intrinsically shaped by that 
horizon, that is: they are determined in their very thingness by the elusive operations 
of cultural background forces. In other words, even the idea of a ‘bare thing’ univer-
sally understood is really only part of a culturally shaped horizon.
We can come a long way when we interpret ‘being’ for Heidegger as the implicit 
background structure set by cultural practice and historical situatedness. Since, as 
we have just seen, the being of things—so the implicit way they appear—is not radi-
cally distinct from those things but intrinsically determines them in their manner of 
appearing, both are always necessarily in some way co-given. In other words, wher-
ever there are things, being co-appears (i.e., things cannot but be within and shaped 
by a cultural world-horizon). Now, given the great variations between cultures and 
ages, we can imagine one epoch of history having a closer ‘relation to being’ than 
others. This relation to being amounts plainly to the awareness of the necessary co-
givenness of being. Put the other way around, a close relation to being would mean 
having an implicit understanding that things are not just things. A contrasting case is 
then also conceivable, namely one in which a background understanding would pre-
vail whose interpretative scheme is so forcefully dominant that all concerns about 
11 Not unrelatedly, Dreyfus further claims that Heidegger’s notion of being can be affiliated with the 
concept of paradigm as developed by Kuhn in his 1962 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
12 It is not worth going into the specific case of universals in mathematics and logic here. Heidegger, at 
any rate, does not believe such ideal objects can transcend the finite temporality of the subject in its finite 
world-horizon. Husserl most likely does not either, although he is certainly more careful than Heidegger 
to acknowledge the unique ‘omni-temporal’ structure which ideal objects exhibit.
524 C. van Mazijk 
1 3
being seem senseless. In such a particular day and age, the only things that would be 
granted important and real would be plain things.
This is, in essence, Heidegger’s critique of technology. It is a criticism of what 
I just called the ‘interpretative scheme’ which prevails in modern western cul-
ture. According to Heidegger, things show up for us in a particular way which was 
unknown to most previous generations of people. The same things can appear to us 
and to people of past ages, but the ways in which they do so can be different. To us 
alone do they appear through the lens of technology. With the term ‘technology,’ 
Heidegger does not mean plain tools or instruments but rather a very general and 
implicit way in which things presumably appear. He calls this peculiar scheme the 
‘essence’ of technology to contrast it with technology in the mundane ‘anthropologi-
cal’ sense of any particular group of things or characteristic thereof.13 The ‘essence’ 
of technology, then, does not point to any instance of technological manipulation, 
but to a very general horizon of understanding which has come to prevail and which 
forces itself on all things, our interactions with them, and our thinking about them.
Most of the other important concepts the later Heidegger develops in his writings 
on technology—most notably ‘enframing’ (Ge-stell), ‘standing-reserve’ (Bestand), 
‘destiny’ (Geschick), and ‘challenging-forth’ (herausfordern)—can be explained 
on the basis developed so far. First, by ‘enframing,’ Heidegger means precisely that 
interpretative scheme or frame shaped by the essence of technology. It thus captures 
the general way things are manifest.14 Closely related, ‘standing-reserve’ denotes a 
central characteristic of such manner of appearing of things in our contemporary 
technological enframing, namely their standing ready for use, for exploitation (FT 
20). The world now appears as a collection of objects on standing-reserve; they are 
plain things at our service; technological opportunity.
Third, to understand the rather idiosyncratic idea of ‘destiny,’ we need to take 
note that no interpretative scheme is a purely subjective matter. It is shaped by cul-
tural and historical forces that lie beyond the power of the individual. Any culture 
is therefore destined to look at the world in a certain way, in other words, to have 
their distinctive way of letting things appear. This way itself can be either heeded 
carefully or altogether taken for granted and ignored. In neither case, however, can 
it be controlled freely, which means man’s ‘relation to being’ (to the way things pre-
sent themselves) is to a large extent an inevitable fate.15 This, of course, restrains 
13 “Die Technik ist nicht das gleiche wie das Wesen der Technik […] Die gängige Vorstellung von der 
Technik, wonach sie ein Mittel ist und ein menschliches Tun, kann deshalb die instrumentale und anthro-
pologische Bestimmung der Technik heißen” (FT 9–10).
14 “‘Ge-stell’ heißt die Weise des Entbergens, die im Wesen der modernen Technik waltet und selber 
nichts Technisches ist” (FT 24); “Es ist die Weise, nach der sich das Wirkliche als Bestand entbirgt” (FT 
27).
15 Heidegger uses the example of Plato as an illustration: “Daß sich seit Platon das Wirkliche im Lichte 
von Ideen zeigt, hat Plato nicht gemacht. Der Denker hat nur dem entsprochen, was sich ihm zusprach” 
(FT 21). In other words, Plato did not himself control the way things appeared to him; he only described 
how he saw it. Likewise, “so ist denn die moderne Technik als das bestellende Entbergen kein bloß men-




Heidegger’s space to construe a solution to the problem of technological enframing, 
which will concern us later.
Lastly, the ‘essence’ of technology, as a way of appearing, is also characterized 
by Heidegger in terms of a ‘challenging’. This concept is closely related to the con-
cept of standing-reserve. The fact of things appearing as standing-reserve makes that 
it becomes easy for us to use and exploit things in ways which could be said to ‘chal-
lenge’ their natural mode of presenting. Technology, so to say, levels them out; it 
puts all things on a par as exploitable resources. For example, instead of this patch 
of land calling out to be used for this kind of harvest and the other for another due 
to their natural characteristics, the land now appears everywhere as something to be 
challenged in order to make it serve whatever function forced upon it (FT 17–19). 
To give another example, in other ages, Heidegger thinks, a silver chalice was not 
like a plastic cup made just in order to drink from it. It was rather, Heidegger claims, 
that to be drank from. In other words, the silver resource was not ‘challenged’ when 
it became molded into a cup; it rather held that potential naturally within the larger 
cultural scheme of things. The plastic of today’s disposable coffee cup, on the other 
hand, would be the product of a different kind of attitude toward the natural world 
and our own place therein, which reflects the kind of standing-reserve use-and-dis-
pose-of attitude of contemporary western civilization.
Much of Heidegger’s thinking about enframing after the Kehre proceeds through 
rather eccentric philosophical–etymological reflections. Heidegger believed that 
by analyzing the changes language undergoes over time he could reveal something 
of the shifts in the tacit background understandings that prevailed. For one, he 
famously claimed that technē for the Greeks did not involve the kind of challenging-
manipulating of things as it does for us. A different interpretative frame ostensibly 
ruled here. According to Heidegger, the Greek technē did not signify a challeng-
ing but rather a ‘bringing-forth’ (Her-vor-bringen) (FT 17–18). Technique was not 
merely an exploitation of things to a certain end—as would be our contemporary 
way of technological disclosure (herausfordernde Entbergen), but instead more akin 
to a kind of creatively allowing something to reveal itself. Instrumental praxis here 
still held a certain connection to the beautiful (FT 38). This is why, Heidegger sug-
gests, technē for the Greeks included not just technology but likewise the arts. Art 
was not a part of technē because art was technological in our contemporary sense, 
but precisely because technology itself was a creative bringing-forth just as art is.
In another one of his philosophical–etymological inquiries, Heidegger claims that 
the technological way of relating to things (in terms of challenging and standing-
reserve) can be traced back specifically to the advent of early modern science.16 It is 
not, however, as one might expect, modern science which steered the course of this 
development. Instead, Heidegger suggests, it is because the technological enframing 
became dominant that exact science was called forth. This seems to make exact sci-
ence derived from the ‘essence’ of technology, rather than technology being some 
form of applied science as most are now probably prone to understand it. It seems 
16 “Dementsprechend zeigt sich das bestellende Verhalten des Menschen zuerst im Aufkommen der 
neuzeitlichen exakten Naturwissenschaft” (FT 25).
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it could easily be argued against this, however, that the concept of an ‘essence’ of 
technology thus drastically inflates; it would have prevailed already before mod-
ern science and therewith also before the technological revolutions of the renais-
sance  (see also Wheeler 2011). At other points, Heidegger casts doubts again on 
this reading, noting that the ‘essence’ of technology did not ‘hold sway already’ in 
early modernity, but rather something closer to an omen (Vorbote) of that made its 
appearance here (FT 25).17
The relation between modern science and technology becomes somewhat clearer 
if we consider Heidegger etymological interpretations of the concepts of ‘reality’ 
(Wirkliche) and ‘theory’ (Theorie) (WB 47–53). Regarding the first, Heidegger 
mainly focuses on showing somewhat uncontroversially that the kind of enframing 
in Greek academic life did not let ‘reality’ appear as exhaustible in terms of effects 
and consequences (causa efficiens) (WB 47–48). Regarding the second, he claims 
that the Greeks did not entertain the kind of objectifying attitude known to moderns 
which assesses the ‘real’ as something independently standing over-against (Gegen-
ständlich). According to Heidegger, in seeking to take this kind of objective, non-
interfering stance vis-à-vis reality, the moderns actually conceal a fundamental part 
of reality. Their disinterested outlook is not the non-doing they think it is, but a pow-
erful attitude of challenging-forth (herausfordern) (WB 49–53). Science, then, acts 
on reality, and over a long period of time shapes the way all things appear, thereby 
excluding alternative ways of appearing. The analyses of ‘reality’ and ‘theory’ thus 
lead to the same conclusion the critique of technology yielded, namely that our con-
temporary enframing shallow thinking about important questions concerning ontol-
ogy in a way ultimately beyond our free control.
Heidegger’s critiques of technology and of science therefore interlace.18 In fact, 
technological instrumentality is linked closely to the prevalence of the causa effi-
ciens with the advent of modern science (FT 11–14); the former is even said to 
subsist in or to be grounded in the causal (beruht im Kausalen). Heidegger fur-
ther relates the concepts of enframing, challenging, and ordering that belong to the 
‘essence’ of technology directly to causality, objectivity, and mathematical-exact 
determination as traits of the ‘essence’ of modern science (WB 53–58). It is, then, 
not just technology, but the combination of the ‘essences’ of technology and science 
which constitutes the imminent threat (Gefahr).
For Heidegger, this threat seems in the end to be almost exclusively ontological; 
it is the threat of an utter oblivion to the way of appearing itself, i.e., to being. In a 
sense, the way of appearing which prevails—as things on standing-reserve await-
ing our challenging use and as nothing more than causal events in a spatiotemporal 
17 Elsewhere, Heidegger suggests Descartes played a crucial role in opening up the new technological-
scientific worldview characterized by human domination: “Das Tor in den Wesensbezirk dieser metaphy-
sisch verstandenen Herrschaft hat Descartes mit dem Satz cogito sum aufgestoßen” (GA 6.1, 166).
18 In like manner, Glazebrook (2000) in his book Heidegger’s Philosophy of Science identifies Hei-




order—covers itself over.19 The technological enframing ‘hides not only a former 
way of appearing as bringing-forth, but moreover hides the appearing as such’ (FT 
31).20 More simply put, Heidegger believed it prevents us from seeing that what 
appears to us as ‘real’ is only an interpretative scheme. It does not hold the truth 
about things, but rather conceals the final truth understood as the event (Ereignis) of 
the openness of things within a culturally determined world-horizon.
Ultimately, Heidegger does not offer any concrete cure to the problem of technol-
ogy and science as interpretative frame. Its forces are not alterable by the efforts 
of any individual. New roads or possibly old ones21 might open themselves in the 
future if we pay sufficient heed to the problem. The sciences themselves, Heidegger 
contends, are too segregated to offer solutions; they are confined to their restricted 
fields of inquiry beyond which they may not ask (WB 49–58). As the German ideal-
ists of the early nineteenth century, Heidegger alludes to art as a place to look for 
new possible ways of things showing themselves, but does not elaborate the point 
further (FT 36).
It remains at this point an open question how Heidegger thinks he has justified his 
preference for one scheme over another. For one, it seems it could easily be argued 
that the plastic cup discussed earlier also fits neatly within its scheme of practices 
and ways of appearing. If indeed so, then what enables Heidegger to reject it? What 
warrants the apparent conservative appeal to the pre-technological/scientific horizon 
as the preferable one? Why exactly is the technological-scientific worldview consid-
ered a threat?
Part of an answer, as was mentioned already, is that Heidegger thinks the techno-
logical scheme prevents all things from expressing something like their own unique 
character (see also Lovitt 1977: xxviii–xxix). Since their relation to us is universal-
ized as a relation of standing-reserve,22 we allegedly challenge things rather than 
allowing them to express themselves—as the examples of the silver of the chalice 
and the different patches of land illustrate. Second, and this is another side of the 
same coin, Heidegger thinks the technological-scientific scheme effectively con-
ceals our relation to being. We now only see a totality of things ready at our dis-
posal, and since being is not a thing, the very necessity of thinking about being over 
against beings is concealed. As W. Lovitt aptly puts it, technology is ‘the thinking 
that degrades Being’ (1977: xxxii)—and being is what thinking is all about for 
Heidegger.
One could, of course, ask for a still deeper justification. Why do we need to let 
things show something like their own character and why do we need a relationship 
22 “Das Wesende der Technik bedroht das Entbergen, droht mit der Möglichkeit, daß alles Entbergen im 
Bestellen aufgeht und alles sich nur in der Unverborgenheit des Bestandes darstellt” (FT 38).
19 “Sie lassen sogar ihren eigenen Grundzug, nämlich dieses Entbergen als ein solches nicht mehr zum 
Vorschein kommen” (FT 31).
20 “So verbirgt denn das herausfordernde Ge-stell nicht nur eine vormalige Weise des Entbergens, das 
Her-vor-bringen, sondern es verbirgt dat Entbergen als solches und mit ihm Jenes, worin sich unverbor-
genheit, d.h. Wahrheit ereignet” (FT 31).
21 Heidegger refers to the pre-technological horizon as an ‘ursprünglicheres Entbergen’ (FT 32).
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to being above anything else? Unlike his former master Husserl, Heidegger does 
not uphold the ideal of a perfectly rational-responsible community which would 
allow all things to express their own essence as phenomenology exposes them. For 
Husserl, for instance, ‘material thing’ is an ‘essence’ (an essential way of possible 
object-presentation for consciousness), and hence also one or more sciences target-
ing that ‘region’ are required by a responsible community of people. The same goes 
for ‘consciousness’ or ‘numbers’; these too are essential ways of object-presentation 
which, by essence differing from material thingness, require their respective sci-
ences. Husserl can thus warrant the need of essence expression and correlatively 
can justify criticisms of essence concealments by the normative ideal of a perfectly 
rational community. Heidegger, on the other hand, thinks the classic philosophical 
trajectory guided by reason has definitively become inaccessible to modern human-
ity, and so seems barred from that justificatory route.23
Ultimately, Heidegger’s critique of the technological-scientific worldview does 
not appear to involve any arguments for the primacy of our relation to being. It none-
theless seems to presuppose them, since the concealment of that relation is defined 
as this worldview’s principal shortcoming. To be sure, Heidegger elaborated on the 
importance of the question of being substantially in earlier works. Discussing this 
would, however, take us too far beyond our current concerns.
Husserl on the Technological‑Scientific Worldview
Whereas Heidegger distinguished between an ‘essence’ of technology and a closely 
related ‘essence’ of science, Husserl’s interpretation of the crisis facing western civ-
ilization in the 1936-work Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften limits its focus 
mostly on the development of what he calls the modern ‘idea’ of science (Idee der 
Wissenschaft) from the Renaissance onwards (Hua VI 3). The crisis, as Husserl 
understands it, is present in his day yet still ‘rapidly growing’ (Hua VI 14). While 
there certainly are crises unfolding within the foundations of various sciences, 
including the formal or exact disciplines, the crisis Husserl has in mind is not one 
about science. It rather concerns the spiritual foundations of western culture. The 
reason Husserl focuses predominantly on the idea of modern science nonetheless is 
that he believes it above everything else has come to shape the way things appear to 
us, to the extent that it has ‘controlled all development of world-considerations until 
the present day’ (Hua VI 54).24
Husserl, then, like Heidegger, is well aware that things are seen and interpreted 
differently by people over different times. He is, in fact, undoubtedly more sensi-
tive to detail in his philosophical–historical reflections than Heidegger. Unlike the 
23 “Aber mit dem Ende der Philosophie ist nicht auch schon das Denken am Ende, sondern im Übergang 
zu einem anderen Anfang” (ÜdM 79).
24 “Mit Galilei’s mathematisierende Umdeutung der Nature setzen sich auch über die Natur hinaus-
reichende, verkehrte Konsequenzen fest, die von ihr aus so naheliegend waren, daβ sie alle weiteren 




rather broad and opaque accounts of ‘essences’ developed by Heidegger, Husserl 
takes painstaking effort to explain what he means by the idea of science and follows 
its development through modernity in considerable detail. Yet, much like Heidegger, 
he understands this idea not as an explicitly articulated one but as governed by unar-
ticulated drives or forces (Triebkräften).25 In a way reminding of Heidegger’s talk of 
destiny, Husserl notes that a tacit yet powerful ‘direction of will’ pervades and gov-
erns us (hindurchgehende Willensrichtung). The philosophical–historical enterprise 
of Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften therefore requires a peculiar breaking of 
the ‘crust’ of the surface of historical events in order to uncover a deeper mean-
ing which did not explicitly surface at the time.26 Although a continuous matter of 
debate, these historical inquiries are most likely not to be considered phenomeno-
logical investigations.27 They are better understood as forming a philosophical–his-
torical introduction to phenomenology.28
Again in accordance with Heidegger, Husserl speaks of the modern idea of sci-
ence as one which aims at ‘controlling’ (beherrschen) the ‘totality of things gen-
erally’ (Allheit des überhaupt Seienden). Moreover, it is said the modern scientific 
image gradually gained a certain control over people, shaping the sorts of questions 
people feel warranted in asking. Mere sciences of fact, Husserl notes, also make 
people of facts.29 In particular the ‘positivistic shrinking of the idea of science’ (Hua 
VI 5) which Husserl sees developing in the second half of the nineteenth century 
ended up barring us from asking important questions.30 These include ‘questions of 
humanity’ (Menschheitsfragen)—among others existential-ontological ones pertain-
ing to the meaning of being or human existence31—but also metaphysical or philo-
sophical questions (Hua VI 8), understood generally as those which transcend the 
world conceived of as universe of mere facts.32 The positivism which is the out-
growth of the development of modern science ‘decapitates’ philosophy (Hua VI 7); 
it ‘threatens to consume’ it (Hua V 13). The current inability to ask such questions is 
25 Husserl uses the term ‘inner drives’ (innersten Triebkräften) at several places (Hua VI 54, 75), 
although contexts suggest this should not be taken in any strict terminological sense.
26 “Wir versuchen, durch die Kruste der veräuβerlichten ‘historischen Tatsachen’ der Philosophie-
geschichte durchzustoβen, deren inneren Sinn, ihre verborgene Teleologie, befragend, aufweisend, 
erprobend” (Hua VI 16). Also: “Es heiβt, die sedimentierte Begrifflichkeit, die als Selbstverständlichkeit 
der Boden seiner privaten und unhistorischen Arbeit ist, wieder lebendig zu machen in seinem verbor-
genen geschichtlichen Sinn” (Hua VI 73).
27 See especially Morisson (1977), Casement (1988) and Hopkins (2003) for able discussions.
28 Ingarden (1972) is best known for defending this position. It is also reflected in Carr’s (2010) more 
recent suggestion that Husserl regarded phenomenology “as a project of universality that is aware of its 
own particularity and historicity” (Carr 2010: 99).
29 “Bloβe Tatsachenwissenschaften Machen bloβe Tatsachenmenschen” (Hua VI 4).
30 On this point, too, Heidegger is not too far from Husserl. Heidegger saw in Nietzsche rather than in 
scientific positivism the completion of the historical movement that resulted in the expelling all questions 
of traditional philosophy.
31 “Gerade die Fragen schlieβt sie prinzipiell aus, die für den in unseren unseligen Zeiten den schick-
salsvollsten Umwälzungen preisgegebenen Menschen die brennenden sind: die Fragen nach Sinn oder 
Sinnlosigkeit dieses ganzen menschliches Daseins” (Hua VI 4).
32 “Alle diese ‘metaphysischen’ Fragen weit gefaβt, die spezifisch philosophischen in der üblichen Rede, 
übersteigen die Welt als Universum der bloβen Tatsachen” (Hua VI 7).
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essential to Husserl’s take on the crisis; they are what previously animated scientific 
inquiry, no matter how tacitly, thereby providing an overall sense of direction and a 
kind of positive spirit or ‘swing’ (Schwung) to their progressions (Hua VI 7).
The structure of Husserl’s diagnosis of the crisis can be summarized as follows. 
In brief, while the institution of the modern idea of science in the Renaissance made 
possible the new positivistic sciences, the latter have come to control the spirit of 
contemporary European humanity33 in general (Geistes des neuzeitlichen europäis-
chen Menschentums überhaupt) (Hua VI 59). This means Husserl focuses on the 
historical development of the idea of modern science and its positivistic outgrowth 
in order to elucidate the meaning of the crisis, which in turn is a crisis of spirit rather 
than of science. Exactly as Heidegger suggested some 15 years later, Husserl notes 
that the sciences, because they are locked within their own regional domains, are 
unable to address concerns of spiritual humanity (Hua VI 4). More crucially still, 
Husserl thinks they in fact expel them from any possible legitimate form of under-
standing (Hua VI 5). In other words, the crisis is essentially the holding sway of a 
certain frame of understanding, historically determined through the idea of modern 
science, which makes all questions transcending mere facts nonsensical—the same 
questions which (ironically) once motivated the modern idea of science.
The threat Husserl sees western society faced with thus shares with Heidegger’s 
critique a chief concern for the need for fundamental questioning. But for Heidegger, 
as we saw previously, the diagnosis and cure were cashed out almost exclusively in 
ontological terms. His critiques of technology and science said nothing about rea-
son, human responsibility, justice, and so forth; they pertained to our ‘relation to 
being’ only. This contrasts in complicated ways with Husserl, for whom the impor-
tance of philosophical questions has everything to do with reason, truth, and ethical 
responsibility.34 Husserl does not merely highlight the necessity of a ‘questioning 
thinking’ (to borrow a phrase from Heidegger), he also provides detailed answers 
in other writings based on his own conception of transcendental phenomenology. 
Before turning to that, however, the diagnosis of the crisis through the idea of sci-
ence needs to be clarified further here.
Husserl traces the idea of modern science back to the Renaissance, at first in par-
ticular to Galilei.35 The unique impulse Renaissance philosophy gave to western civ-
ilization, he claims, rests on the institution of a simple but revolutionary double idea 
(Hua VI 5 19–20). It is the invention of a new way of conceiving of the world we 
34 See particularly Melle (1991, 1998) for a discussion of Husserl’s ethical views and the role it takes in 
his philosophy.
35 The emphasis on Galilei does not figure prominantly in any of Husserl’s earlier writings. Buckley 
(1992: 42) suggests the conception of Galilei as father of the new worldview can be traced at least to 
Windelband’s Die Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, which Husserl had read.
33 The term ‘Europe’ for Husserl is not a geographical notion, but, as Buckley also rightly pointed out, 
refers to “nothing less than a form of life guided by scientific rationality […]. Europe is a spiritual desig-




live in as one consisting of a totality of things forming a single rational unity,36 and 
more specifically, a rational unity that is controllable in its entire determinable being 
through one universal mathematical science.37 Thus Husserl’s quest at first becomes 
to show how mathematics is employed and conceived of in relation to the study of 
nature, which he traces from Galilei and Descartes through to Spinoza, Leibniz, 
Locke, Berkeley, and finally to Kant (Hua VI 20–104).
The theme of Husserl’s investigation, however, is not the content matter of math-
ematics itself, but the development of the tacitly operative idea of modern science 
as a universal mathematical science of nature. Husserl does not lump centuries 
of developments into one idea of technological or scientific conceiving, but care-
fully treats different thinkers and the mark they left on the contemporary scientific 
worldview separately. Yet again in a vocabulary reminding of the later Heidegger, 
he speaks of the great philosophers of modern science as ‘concealing and uncon-
cealing’ (entdeckender und verdeckender) geniuses (Hua VI 53). Especially when 
their ideas are taken over by next generations, tacit ‘shifts in meaning’ (Sinnver-
schiebungen) take place (Hua VI 46). Just as Heidegger analyzed words to reveal 
shifts in background understandings, Husserl claims that what superficially appears 
to be one scientific enterprise can acquire a different meaning over time. It is con-
textualized differently; set within a changed horizon of sense (verwandelten Sinne-
shorizont) (Hua VI 48), with the original thinking (ursprüngliches Denken) being 
tacitly covered over.
This process, according to Husserl, makes it possible for science ultimately to 
become mere technē.38 In fact, as Husserl further remarks, the threat of science 
becoming mere technē is inherent to the very essence of the new science. Nature can 
be controlled by the new mathematical science only through a ‘meaning-emptied 
technical thinking’ (sinnesentleertes technisches Denken) (Hua VI 57). This emp-
tying of meaning is simply a necessary consequence of its thoroughly formalized 
method. The increasing formalization of exact natural science is simultaneously a 
concealing of the original meaning which the scientist, ‘in the best case a brilliant 
technician in the respective method,’ is generally not capable of retrieving.39 To lay 
bare the development of the changing sense of the idea of modern science thus calls 
for a new kind of historical and responsible critique beyond the scopes of the sci-
ences—which is the partial aim of Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften.40
36 “Kein Wunder, daß wir schon bei Descartes die Idee einer Universalmathematik finden […]. 
Demnach bekommt korrelativ Welt und Philosophie ein völlig neues Gesicht. Die Welt muß an sich eine 
rationale Welt sein, im neuen Sinne der Rationalität” (Hua VI 62).
37 ‘[D]ie Idee, daβ die unendliche Allheit des überhaupt Seienden in sich eine rationale Alleinheit sei, 
die korrelativ durch eine universale Wissenschaft, und zwar restlos, zu beherrschen sei" (Hua VI 20).
38 Just as Heidegger, Husserl uses both the Greek word techne and the German word Kunst, meaning 
‘art’ in English (Hua VI 57).
39 “Aber der Mathematiker, der Naturwissenschaftler, günstigerfalls ein höchst genialer Techniker der 
Methode […] ist eben normalerweise durchaus nicht befähigt, solche Besinnungen durchzuführen” (Hua 
VI 57).
40 ‘Ein verantwortliche Kritik’; ‘eine Kritik eigener Art’; ‘eine historische Rückbesinnung’ (Hua VI 73).
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Originally, Husserl notes, the modern idea of a universal mathematical science 
of nature had its roots in the practical measuring activities of the pre-scientifically 
experienced surrounding world (vorwissenschaftlich-anschaulichen Umwelt) (Hua 
VI 24). The things of the experienced surrounding world already have their own 
‘habits’ and ‘typicalities’; their typical ways of appearing and relating to each other 
(Hua VI 28). This goes for their shapes, qualities, patterns of behavior, interactions, 
and so on. Phenomenologically speaking, to perceive is always to have something 
given in a pattern of future directed expectations; it involves complex ‘predictions’ 
of future occurrences, although these predictions are of a distinctively passive kind. 
However, things do not for that reason appear as structured according to absolute 
laws. The very idea that all things would stand under such laws naturally has no 
place in pre-scientific experience at all.
The great event of modern science, according to Husserl, is that it conceives for 
the first time of that idea; that the endless field of experienced objects with their pre-
given typicalities and habits is determinable through its approximation to ideal sys-
tems in a way universally accessible to anyone. The Greeks, Husserl thinks, lacked 
that idea. To be sure, they had mathematical systems, and these were at various 
instances applied to nature. Yet Husserl maintains that the relation of pure mathe-
matics to the world of everyday experience was here framed differently. Natural sci-
ence in the modern sense is not just mathematics occasionally applied to nature. It 
is a distinctive idea, which later becomes an implicit interpretative scheme, namely 
that the totality of endlessly experienceable nature can be made to fit in ever-increas-
ing exactitude universally valid mathematical systems. It is only relative to that idea 
that the geometries of the Greeks can be contrasted as being ‘world-estranged’ (wel-
tentfremdete ideale Geometrie) (Hua VI 31).
Importantly, this idea is not immediately conceived of with regard to the total-
ity of worldly beings. At first, it is applied to the spatiotemporal manifold only. The 
new science of nature initially manages to establish exact results solely in regard of 
shapes (Gestaltenmathematik). This is ultimately due to the fact that, phenomeno-
logically speaking, pre-scientific experience constitutes all things with extension for 
all of us (Hua VI 30). Yet, Husserl notes, the question soon arises whether some-
thing similar could not also hold for the concrete world in all its conceivable deter-
minations.41 That is to say, that a mathematical index could hold for any possible 
determination of res extensa; for color, sound, warmth, and so on (Hua VI 35). This 
idea, Husserl claims, while today treated as ‘unquestionably obvious’ (fraglose Selb-
stverständlichkeit) (Hua VI 35), was not yet wholly transparent to Galilei who first 
instituted the modern idea of science.
41 “Muβ ähnliches nicht für die konkrete Welt überhaupt möglich sein? Ist man gar schon vermöge 
der Rückwendung der Renaissance zur alten Philosophie – wie Galilei – in der sicheren Überzeugung 
der Möglichkeit einer Philosophie, einer objektive Weltwissenschaft leistenden Episteme, und hatte es 
sich eben schon gezeigt, daβ reine Mathematik, angewandt auf Natur, das Postulat der Episteme in ihrer 
Gestaltensphäre vollendet erfülle: muβte da für Galilei nicht auch vorgezeichnet sein die Idee einer in 




Thus, Husserl suggests, the idea of a mathesis universalis in Leibnizian fash-
ion came to be conceived; a single universal science for the totality of beings in 
all their natural-objective determinations. The obvious problem this new idea faces 
is, however, that it is unclear how the ‘sensible qualities’ (sinnliche Qualitäten) of 
the objects of the experienced surrounding world could approximate an ideally con-
structed index in the same direct manner as their extension can (Hua VI 31–32). 
Colors, sounds, temperatures, and so on, are not like spatiality measurable directly 
in relation to any mathematical system accessible to all which they can approximate 
in increasing exactitude (Hua VI 32–33).42 This, too, of course, has its particular 
phenomenological foundations, but that lies beyond the scope of the historical-intro-
ductory function of Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften.
The very problem of the mathematizability of sensible qualities is absolutely cen-
tral to Husserl’s tracing of the roots of the crisis. Husserl thinks this problem, which 
is originally of a theoretical-methodological nature and furthermore wholly indebted 
to the guiding ideal of a single universal science of the totality of nature, undergoes 
peculiar shifts of sense over time; it becomes appropriated ontologically and epis-
temologically. In short, Husserl believes the theoretical problem of the exact deter-
mination of extra-spatiotemporal features reifies the idea that through all changes 
in subjective apprehension there is given one true world, namely that world which 
is universally knowable in mathematical exactitude by abstracting from all suppos-
edly merely subjective-contingent qualities (Hua VI 32). In other words, since extra-
spatiotemporal features of objects cannot be directly correlated to ideal poles of pure 
mathematical systems, they are no longer considered part of the real. The limited 
scope of possible success of the modern scientific method thus leads to a confusion 
of the restrains of method for the actual object under scrutiny. It is a case of the con-
cept or method become reality.43
This is, in brief, the first important change of sense which the modern idea of 
science made possible. It is, Husserl thinks, the break of the original unity of the 
human–world relation in pre-scientific world-experience into an ‘objective’ and a 
‘subjective’ part as a result of the problem of bringing extra-spatiotemporal fea-
tures—not only sensory qualities but also all cultural productions (Kultureigenschaf-
ten) and ultimately the psyche or consciousness itself—in direct correspondence 
to a mathematical index. This is cashed out, roughly speaking, first in the distinc-
tion between primary and secondary qualities for the empiricists and later between 
pure and empirical concepts for Kant. This way, the new science first brings with 
it a ‘complete metamorphosis of the idea of world in general’ (Hua VI 61).44 The 
42 “Aber die rein in diesen fundierten qualitativen Konfigurationen sind keine Analoga der raumzeitli-
chen Gestalten, sind nicht eingeordnet in eine ihnen eigene Weltform. Die Limesgestalten dieser Qual-
itäten sind nicht in analogem Sinne idealisierbar, ihre Messungen (‘Schätzungen’) nicht auf entsprech-
ende Idealitäten einer konstruierbaren, einer schon in Idealität objektivierten Welt zu beziehen” (Hua VI 
33).
43 “Das Ideenkleid macht es, daβ wir für wahres Sein nehmen, was eine Methode ist” (Hua VI 52).
44 “[D]aß die Auffassung der neuen Idee ‘Natur’ als einer abgekapselten, einer real und theoretisch in 
sich geschlossenen Körperwelt, alsbald eine völlige Verwandlung der Idee der Welt überhaupt mit sich 
führt” (Hua VI 61).
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original unity of the human–world relation is overlaid by a theoretical distinction 
which shapes and constrains what we think of as real.
The second, related consequence that is of perhaps even greater importance to 
Husserl is the likewise ‘now obvious’ distinction which has come to prevail between 
a priori mathematical-ideal and a posteriori natural-scientific knowledge. According 
to Husserl, the successes of pure mathematics and the a priori certainty of its results 
contrast with the laws of nature which, although thoroughly mathematical them-
selves, are considered a posteriori for being only inductively accessible and derived 
from factual experiences. The two kinds of knowledge seem to oppose each other 
naturally: a priori mathematics of ideal space and time, and—although employing 
a priori mathematics—impure natural science (Hua VI 55–56). It is on grounds of 
this conception that Kant develops the early modern ontology of primary and sec-
ondary qualities in epistemological terms. That is to say, we find the same underly-
ing thought now expressed in terms of our mind’s access to the world. It leads to 
the idea that while we allegedly possess an ‘inborn’ capacity for a priori insight in 
mathematics concerning space and time, we have no such a priori evidences regard-
ing anything that involves any concrete worldly content because of our inductive 
access to all laws governing that. This conception, therefore, still cannot unify the 
human–world relation because the notion of a priori gets wrongly restricted solely to 
mathematics.45
In short, then, Husserl believed the successes of modern mathematical natural sci-
ence led to the reconceptualization of the human–world relation as divided into sub-
jective (‘illusory’) sensory fillings of objects and objective (‘real’) spatiotemporal 
determinations, while dividing the cognitive faculty in a posteriori knowledge about 
nature and a priori knowledge exclusively concerning the mathematics of space and 
time. Kant’s transcendental theory is thus deemed no exception to the ruling par-
adigm. For Husserl, it rather rephrases the same idea in transcendental-epistemo-
logical terms, qualifying on supposedly a priori grounds (through a transcendental 
45 Husserl deems the restriction of a priori evidence to mathematics as in Kant a ‘mythical’ construc-
tion (Hua VI 116–118). At the point of writing Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften, Husserl thought 
he had already clarified the essence of a priori evidence elsewhere in his elaborate phenomenological 
work on pure imagination. In brief, Husserl maintained that a priori refers to pure possibility, i.e., to pure 
imaginative possibility in detachment from actuality. Any a priori proposition is one which holds valid in 
pure possibility, and therefore ‘prescribes rules’ to the actual (as an instance of the possible). Euclidean 
geometrical propositions are examples of regionally valid a priori propositions (valid within a Euclid-
ean manifold). But, Husserl continues, “there is not the slightest reason to consider the methodological 
structure of a priori thinking […] as an exclusive property of the mathematical sphere” (Husserl 1997a: 
353). This is because the capacity for the free variation of possible instances in pure imagination which 
is involved in a priori cognition is ‘everywhere the same’ (Husserl 1997a: 354). Therefore, “from every 
concrete actuality, and every individual trait actually experienced in it or capable of being experienced, 
a path stands open to the realm of ideal or pure possibility and consequently to that of a priori thinking” 




examination of a priori ‘inborn’ forms) as unscientific all propositions not construed 
out of the a priori spatiotemporal manifold.
Simultaneously, Husserl notes, great problems for the development of a rational 
psychology—in other words, for a mathematical index for the study of subjec-
tive consciousness—are brought into the horizon of the modern idea of science.46 
Guided by the ideal of one universal science of objective nature, the psyche too is 
enframed as an object in the causal world order. But this problem, although leading 
to the allegedly flawed naturalist epistemologies of in particular Locke and Hume, 
simultaneously makes something good possible. Specifically under the unprec-
edented severity of the Humean threat of skepticism the advent of an alternative, 
indeed contrary, philosophical worldview is brought into being, namely that of tran-
scendental philosophy (Hua VI 70–71).
As Husserl develops in many of his works, the naturalistic-positivistic sciences, 
here understood as the outcome of the modern idea of an all-encompassing math-
ematical natural science, depart from a naïve acceptance of a world of self-existing 
objects.47 According to Husserl, in a completely evolved philosophical naturalism, 
reason starts and terminates with those self-existing objects.48 Beyond them, there 
are no longer meaningful questions possible. Transcendentalism, on the other hand, 
says that the sense of independent being the world of natural science has just is an 
accomplishment of subjective experience.49 Thus, instead of starting with the object 
and from there running against the wall of subjectivity, it starts with the latter and 
appropriates the objective world rightly as a sense-accomplishment of subjective 
experience. Naturalism, as Husserl maintained from very early on, shall in fact never 
be able to describe the subjective life of consciousness in mathematical exactitude. 
Even if perfect mathematical indices would be developed, the results would inevi-
tably yield mere correlations  (see, especially, Hua V 16–19). They would bypass 
the essence of consciousness itself, which Husserl thinks is inherently non-spa-
tial—much like the idealities of mathematics are not anywhere in three-dimensional 
space.
The rest of the history of philosophy after Kant, Husserl notes, can be character-
ized as a battle between naturalism and transcendentalism (Hua VI 71). The first 
46 While the modern conception of mind starts with Descartes, Husserl sees in Locke—whom he 
appears to hold in particularly low regard—the first systematic attempt at an objective-naturalistic episte-
mology and theory of consciousness (Hua VI 85–88).
47 “Die naivität der Rede von ‘objektivität’, die die Erfahrende, erkennende, die wirklich konkret leis-
tende Subjektivität ganz ausser Frage lässt, die Naivität der Wissenschaftslers von der Natur, von der 
Welt überhaupt, der blind ist dafür, das alle die Wahrheiten, die er als objektive gewinnt, und die objek-
tive Welt selbst, die in seinem Formeln Substrat ist […] sein eigenes, in ihm selbst gewordenes Leb-
ensgebilde ist” (Hua VI 99).
48 “Alle objektive Weltbetrachtung ist Betrachtung im ‘auβen’ und erfaβt nur ‘Auβelichkeiten’, Objektiv-
itäten” (Hua VI 116).
49 “Das Charakteristische des Objektivismus ist, daß er sich auf dem Boden der durch Erfahrung selb-
stverständlich vorgegebenen Welt bewegt […]. Damit werde das letztlich Seiende erreicht, hinter das 
zurückfragen keinen vernünftige Sinn mehr hätte […]. Der Transzendentalismus dagegen sagt: der Seins-
sin der vorgegebenen Lebenswelt ist subjektives Gebilde, ist Leistung des erfahrenden, des vorwissen-
schaflichen Lebens. In ihm baut sich der Sinn und die Seinsgeltung der Welt auf” (Hua VI 70).
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movement finally strands in the positivistic sciences; the other terminates in tran-
scendental phenomenology. One is responsible for the crisis; the other the solution 
to it. Scientific positivism, starting and terminating with objects, cannot explain but 
estranges from consciousness, ideal laws, and indeed all fundamental philosophi-
cal concerns—particularly the ‘mystery of all mysteries’ (Rätsel aller Rätsel): the 
essential correlation of ‘thinking and being’ (Vernunft und Seiendem überhaupt), of 
subjectivity and objectivity (Hua VI 12). Which one wins the battle, as Husserl puts 
it somewhat dramatically, is to determine whether the European spirit is reborn out 
of true philosophy or whether the crisis means the downfall of western civilization.50
At this point it would be fair to ask, as we did with Heidegger, what justifies Hus-
serl’s negative evaluation of the development of the idea of modern science. Here, 
however, the answer seems to be quite simple: for Husserl modern science plainly 
ended up getting things wrong. It misconstrues the way the human–world relation 
is essentially constituted while further preventing us from asking deeper questions 
about that, thereby (as Heidegger also said) peculiarly reifying its own flawed per-
spective. This is surely not to say that Husserl is against the natural sciences as such. 
He only criticizes the scientific worldview as the dominant way of conceiving of 
reality, insofar as it is an irrational and therefore irresponsible worldview.
This leaves it open, of course, how exactly Husserl warrants the claim that it is 
wrong. In this respect, Husserl’s critique is, as Heidegger’s, tied cohesively into the 
rest of his philosophy. Its justification ultimately depends on his account of transcen-
dental phenomenology as the professed true end-form (Endstiftung) of the develop-
ment of the idea of modern science. While addressing that obviously lies beyond the 
scope of this paper, it is worth considering some important aspects briefly to shed 
light on the viewpoint from which Husserl criticizes the technological-scientific 
outlook.
In contradistinction to Heidegger’s, Husserl’s critique is driven by the pursuit 
of pure reason and pure human responsibility through the development of a uni-
versal first philosophy. Husserl’s idea of a first philosophy is that of a systematic, 
ideal and thereby universally shareable system which is capable of clarifying the 
final sense of the human–world relation in all its essential aspects. The validity of 
its propositions must further be based on indubitable (a priori) evidence. This task, 
the details of which are not addressed in Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften 
but in other works, presupposes an absolutely certain beginning. As is well known, 
Husserl claims to have found this in the so-called a priori correlation of subject 
and object (Hua VI 161). The a priori correlation, the proof of which is intricate 
and continuously revisited by Husserl, states that there can be no object without 
50 “Die Krise der europäischen Daseins hat nur zwei Auswege: Den Untergang Europas in der Entfrem-
dung gegen seinen eigenen rationalen Lebenssinn, den Verfall in Geisfeindschaft und Barbarei, oder die 
Wiedergeburt Europas aus dem Geiste der Philosophie durch einen den Naturalismus endgültig überwin-




consciousness.51 Even the idea of an object or world independently of consciousness 
requires a consciousness entertaining the idea; it too is a sense accomplished by a 
consciousness. Without dwelling on the details, the task of phenomenology then is 
to take that correlation seriously and to study all the essential structures of all con-
ceivable subject–object relations precisely as they are manifest.
In Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften, the unity of the human–world relation 
is cashed out not in terms of intentionality (as in Ideas I from 1913), but through 
the concept of ‘lifeworld’ (Lebenswelt): the ‘continuously as-real given world expe-
rienced in our concrete world-life’.52 The lifeworld, a richly multi-faceted but also 
relatively elusive concept,53 denotes something like the everyday world of human 
praxis. It is not the ultimate ground of all world-constitution, but rather points to 
the default place human beings have in the world. Even the natural scientist is ulti-
mately a human being living in the experienced everyday world (in dieser Welt leb-
ende Mensch), and the questions she asks can never pertain to more than the world 
of real and possible experiences (wirklicher und möglicher Erfahrungsphänomene) 
(Hua VI 50). Yet the lifeworld is at risk of being forgotten by the positivistic sci-
ences which reduce the world to a mind-independent collection of facts.
Although sometimes taken so, the lifeworld does not seem to be the focal point 
of Husserl’s Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften. It is one of many things whose 
true essence is neglected by fact-oriented science, next to among others subjectivity 
itself, ideal laws, the subject-world correlation, and moral values—none of which 
exist in the stricter naturalistic sense. Ultimately, all these problems—which Husserl 
thinks are unsolvable from a naturalist viewpoint—point to transcendental phenom-
enology as the ultimate responsible philosophy which, unlike the naturalist world-
view which has come to rule, can accommodate in scientific rigor the being of any-
thing just as it presents itself, prior to overlaying it with a technological-scientific 
scheme which would prevent them from expressing their true essence.
Carr (1974) and Moran (2012) both suggested that Husserl vastly over-esti-
mated the potential of transcendental phenomenology by positing it as cure 
for the crisis. Admittedly, it is hard to imagine how the phenomenological sci-
ence we know from Husserl’s collections of manuscripts could save western 
51 This idealist commitment is expressed in near to all Husserl’s writings from Ideen I (1913) onwards—
although the idealist turn can be traced much earlier to the winter lectures of 1906–1907, see also Melle 
(2010). For instance in Ideen I: everything transcendent “muss notwendig Erfahrbar sein […] und nicht 
bloß für ein durch eine leere logische Möglichkeit erdachtes, sondern für irgendein aktuelles Ich” (Hua 
III/1 108); in Cartesianische Meditationen: ‘daß diese Begriffe in ihrer formal-ontologischen Allgemein-
heit eine universal Strukturgesetzmäßigkeit des Bewußtseinsleben überhaupt indizieren, vermöge deren 
allein Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit für uns Sinn haben und Sinn je haben können’ (Hua I 94–95); in Natur 
und Geist: ‘die Welt, jede erdenkliche Welt überhaupt ist nur denkbar als relativ, relativ zu der Wirkli-
chkeit der Bewusstsein’ (Hua XXXII 78); in the lectures Einleitung in die Philosophie: “Gegenständli-
chkeit und Subjektivität stehen a priori in Beziehung zueinander. Jeder Gegenstand ist a priori beziehbar 
auf irgendwelche Ichsubjekte” (Hua XXXV 260); and in Transzendentaler Idealismus: “Bewusstsein und 
Sein must irgendwie zusammenhangen” (Hua XXXVI 56).
52 “[D]er Lebenswelt: der in unserem konkreten Weltleben uns ständig als wirklich gegebenen Welt” 
(Hua VI 51).
53 See especially Carr (1970) for a discussion of the concept of lifeworld.
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civilization. Yet to focus on those meticulous phenomenological analyses would 
be, I would argue, to miss the crux of his criticism. The crisis, for Husserl, as 
for Heidegger, is about a certain way of framing things. This way of framing, 
Husserl maintained, cloaks the true essence of certain things and estranges us 
from deeper inquiries.54 For Husserl as perhaps for any honest philosopher, the 
only way to responsibly disprove this frame and to open a new road beyond it 
would be to show that it is incorrect and to provide a better alternative. Thus 
considered, there can be no responsible solution to the crisis other than of the 
kind Husserl sought to offer: that of a new, rational, and thoroughly transparent 
philosophy.
Conclusion
The extent to which Husserl and Heidegger oppose each other with regard to what 
they take to be genuine philosophy profoundly marks their different solutions to the 
crisis resulting from the technological-scientific worldview. For Husserl, philosophy 
equals responsibility—which can only be achieved through reason—and as such it is 
both an inherently rational as well as an ethical enterprise. It demands loyalty to the 
things themselves, involves rigor and precision to maintain a character of universal-
ity, and requests an unconditional will to determine life individually and socially 
in accordance with laws of reason. For Heidegger, by contrast, the solution to the 
crisis is no longer deemed to lie in the hands of the rational philosopher—hence the 
famous remark that at this point in time ‘only a God can save us’ (nur ein Gott kann 
uns retten).55 Philosophy should instead move to a questioning and heedful thinking 
about being in the most general of terms.
Within this archetypical opposition, however, we found a deeper conver-
gence of ideas regarding technological-scientific enframing. This holds for cer-
tain methodical principles of their respective inquiries—such as the idea that 
we view things differently over time, that we have limited control over this, and 
that we are capable of tracing shifts in background understandings through spe-
cial historical analysis. But it also holds for the content of their criticisms. Both 
philosophers identify a threat in the way science and technology yield a mean-
ing-emptied technical thinking. For both, the problem lies not in science or in 
55 In the 1966 der Spiegel interview (Heidegger 1981).
54 See also Hadjioannou (2019: 66) who yields a position quite opposite to the one I develop here, by 
claiming that Heidegger shows that Husserl’s phenomenology would fall prey to the same kind of ration-
ality and care for certainty that characterized modern philosophy and mathematical science. He also 
claims that since Husserl’s phenomenological attitude is theoretical, it is essentially just like natural sci-
ence, and argues that Husserlian phenomenology speaks “the formal language of assertoric logic and of 
mathematical formulae” (Hadjioannou 2019: 68). I hope my expositions in this paper make clear that 
such claims seriously misrepresent Husserl’s philosophy. A thoroughly rational approach does not, for 
Husserl, necessarily amount to a mathematical or objectivist approach. Hadjioannou’s recent contribution 
does not, to my mind, sufficiently take into account Husserl’s own original criticism of the technological-




technology itself, but in how they have tacitly come to shape our sense of the 
real and the sorts of questions we feel warranted in asking. For Heidegger as for 
Husserl, genuine, non-technical, philosophical thinking can be a matter neither 
of mere logical inference nor of plain empirical facts.56 Philosophy must go 
beyond the sciences in order to provide a meaning which they themselves must 
methodically exclude.
Notwithstanding these deeper similarities between Heidegger’s critique of 
the technological-scientific worldview and Husserl’s some 15 years earlier, one 
cannot avoid the impression that at least in terms of detail of historical-exegetic 
analysis Husserl’s exposition significantly surpasses Heidegger’s. Heidegger’s 
thought on the technological-scientific worldview does not pursue exacti-
tude like Husserl’s. Central notions such as the ‘essence’ of technology and 
of science arguably remain underdeveloped; they are supposed to cover cen-
turies of modern history, their precise signification as well as exact historical 
origin being up to the reader’s guess. Ultimately, in the light of its contrast 
to Husserl’s discussion, this could lead one to wonder what substantial theo-
retical contributions Heidegger’s historically influential work on technology 
really makes. Although potentially unsatisfactory, one possible (and charita-
ble) response to this would once more point to Heidegger’s original departure 
from Husserl regarding what makes a genuine philosopher. The philosopher—
for Heidegger a heeder of being, a task beyond calculative precision, rational 
systematicity, and the pursuit of reason; for Husserl the ‘true rationalist,’57 the 
‘real positivist,’58 the ‘strongest realist,’59 indeed, the transcendental idealist.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, 
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the 
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
56 For Heidegger, genuine thinking can be confirmed nor rejected by logic or facts: “Aber das Einzige, 
was jeweils ein Denker zu sagen vermag, läßt sich logisch oder empirisch weder beweisen noch wider-
legen. Es ist auch nicht die Sache eines Glaubens. Es läßt sich nur fragend-denkend zu Gesicht bringen” 
(WNZ, 115). For Husserl something similar holds albeit for different reasons. For him, phenomenology 
(philosophy) is a science of essences—which are not facts but universals—the study of which involves 
methodically bracketing logical and empirical methods and findings.
57 “Denn von neuem betone ich: wahre und echte Philosophie bzw. Wissenschaft und wahrer und echter 
Rationalismus ist einerlei” (Hua VI 200–201).
58 “Sagt ‘Positivismus’ soviel wie ein absolut vorurteilsfreie Gründung aller Wissenschaften auf das 
‘Positive’, d. i. originär zu Erfassende, dann sind wir die echten Positivisten” (Hua III/1 45).
59 “Einen stärkeren Realismus kann es also nicht geben, wenn dieser Wort nicht mehr besagt als: ‘ich 
bin dessen gewiβ, ein Mensch zu sein, der in dieser Welt lebt usw., und ich zweifle daran nicht im mind-
esten’’ (Hua VI 191); ‘Kein gewöhnlicher ‘Realist’ ist je so realistisch und so concret gewesen als ich, 
der phänomenologische ‘Idealist’” (BW 7 16).
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